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Route Request Flooding Attack Using Trust based
Security Scheme in Manet

Ujwala D. Khartad & R. K. Krishna
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E-mail : ujwala2011.pazare@gmail.com, rkrishna40@rediif.com

Abstract - In recent years, the use of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) has been widespread in many applications, including some
mission critical applications, and as such security has become one of the major concerns in MANETs. A mobile ad hoc network is
set up with a group of mobile wireless nodes without the use of any dedicated routers or base stations. Each node acts as an end node
as well as a router for other nodes. A Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is based on self organizing, dynamic structure and freedom
of mobility idea. The characteristics like dynamic structure, limited power, restricted bandwidth and continuously changing network
routes makes MANET more vulnerable to the attacks and providing the security to it proves to be a challenging area.In this paper,we
describe that how the flooding attack occur and the effect of flooding attack. Finally, we present simulation results to show the
detrimental effects of Flooding Attack.
Keywords - mobile ad hoc network, security, flooding attack, Defense.

I.

the operations of ad hoc networks by injecting wrong
routing information or forging data packets.

INTRODUCTION

A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is
autonomous, infrastructure less network of mobile nodes
that can communicate with each other without the use of
a centralized administration. The applicative areas of
manet are specially emerging operations, military
services, vehicle networks,disaster management,
battlefield surveillance. The manet system can be
viewed as a random graph due to the movement of the
nodes, their transmitter/receiver coverage patterns , the
transmission power levels and the co-channel
interference levels. Hence the network topology keeps
on changing with time as the nodes move or adjusts
their transmission and reception parameters. Thus the
salient characteristics of a manet are dynamic structure,
continuously changing topologies and router restricted
bandwidth, resource constraints, limited physical
security and no infrastructure [7]. A mobile ad hoc
network (MANET) consists of a group of mobile
wireless nodes that allow data communications beyond
direct radio transmission through the use of intermediate
nodes that will help to forward data packets. In
MANETs, there is no central entity to coordinate the
operations of the network, therefore there are more
security challenges as compared to wired networks. Due
to the nature of the wireless medium, malicious nodes or
trusted nodes infected by viruses or worms can disrupt

MANET nodes are equipped with wireless
transmitters and receivers using antennas which may
be omnidirectional (broadcast), highlydirectional
(point-to-point),
possibly
steerable,
or
some
combination thereof. At a given point in time,
depending on the nodes' positions and their transmitter
and receiver coverage patterns, transmission power
levels and co-channel interference levels, a wireless
connectivity in the form of a random, multihop graph or
"ad hoc" network exists between the nodes. This ad
hoc topology may change with time as the nodes move
or adjust their transmission and reception parameters.
This article is structured as follows: We describe
the Route request flooding attack in MANET and
messase format and damages caused by it.Then describe
the how occur the flooding attack in manet.Then what
effects of flooding attack.
II. RELATED WORK
The flooding attack is the most common attack
found in manet. The aim of the flooding attack is to
exhaust the network resources such as bandwidth and to
consume a node’s resources or to disrupt the routing
operation to degrade the network performance. This
leads to a kind of Denial-of- Service (DoS) attack,
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enlarged by increasing the TTL by a fixed value. The
procedure is repeated until a ROUTE REPLY is
received which means that a route has been found.

wastage of bandwidth, wastage of node’s processing
power and exhaustion of node’s battery power as well as
a degraded performance. Most of the network resources
are wasted in trying to generate the routes to the
destination that do not exist. The Route Request
Flooding Attack (RRFA) is a denial-of service attack
which aims to flood the network with a large number of
RREQs to non-existent destinations in the network. In
this attack, the malicious node will generate a large
number of RREQs, possibly in the region of hundreds or
thousands of RREQs, into the network until the network
is saturated with RREQs and unable to transmit data
packets. In RREQ flooding attack the attacker selects
many IP addresses which are not in the network or
select random IP addresses depending on knowledge
about scope of the IP address in the network.

In the flooding attack, the attack node violates the
above rules to exhaust the network resources. Firstly,
the attacker will produce many IP addresses which do
not exist in the networks if he knows the scope of the IP
addresses in the networks. As no node can return
ROUTE REPLY packets for these ROUTE REQUEST,
the reverse route in the nodes’ route table will be
conserved longer than normal. If the attacker cannot get
the scope of IP addresses in the network, he can just
choose random IP addresses. Secondly, the attacker
successively originates mass RREQ messages with these
void IP addresses as destination and tries to send
excessive RREQ without considering the RREQ
RATELIMIT, that is, without waiting for the ROUTE
REPLY or waiting a round-trip time. Besides, the TTL
of RREQ is set up to a maximum at the beginning
without using an expanding ring search method. Under
such attack, the whole network will be full of RREQ
packets from the attacker. The communication
bandwidth and other node resources will be exhausted
by the flooded RREQ packets. For example, the storage
of route table is limited. If the large amounts of RREQ
packets are arriving in a very short time, the storage of
the route table in the node will be used up soon so that
the node can not receive new RREQ packets any more.

III. HOW OCCUR FLOODING ATTACK
The flooding attack occuration was proposed in
[13]. Flood attacks occur when a network or service
becomes so weighed down with packets initiating
incomplete connection requests that it can no longer
process genuine connection requests. By flooding a
server or host with connections that cannot be
completed, the flood attack eventually fills the hosts
memory buffer. Once this buffer is full no further
connections can be made, and the result is a Denial of
Service.
Flooding packets in the whole network will
consume a lot of network resources. To reduce
congestion, the protocol has already adopted some
methods which are briefly described as follows. Firstly,
the number of RREQ that can be originated per second
is limited. Secondly, after broadcasting a RREQ, the
initiator will wait for a ROUTE REPLY.-If a route is not
received within round-trip milliseconds, the node may
try again to discover a route by broadcasting another
RREQ, until it reaches a maximum of retry times at the
maximum TTL value. Time intervals between repeated
attempts by a source node at route discovery for a single
destination must satisfy a binary exponential backoff.
The first time a source node broadcasts a RREQ, it waits
round-trip time for the reception of a ROUTE REPLY
[15].

IV. EFFECT OF FLOODING ATTACK
Flooding Attack can seriously degrade the
performance of reactive routing protocols and affect a
node in the following ways.This was proposed in [15].
A. Degrade the performance in buffer:
The buffer used by the routing protocol may
overflow since a reactive protocol has to buffer data
packets during the route discovery process.
Furthermore, if a large number of data packets
originating from the application layer are actually
unreachable, genuine data packets in the buffer may be
replaced by these unreachable data packets, depending
onthe buffer management scheme used.
B. Degrade the performance in wireless interface :

But for the second RREQ, the time to wait for the
ROUTE REPLY should be calculated according to a
binary exponential backoff, by which the waiting time
now becomes 2 * round-trip time. Thirdly, The RREQ
packets are broadcasted in an incremental ring to reduce
the overhead caused by flooding the whole network. At
first, the packets are flooded in a small area (a ring)
confined by a small starting time-to-live (TTL) in the IP
headers. After RING TRAVERSAL TIME, if no
ROUTE REPLY is received, the forwarding area is

Depending on the design of the wireless interface,
the buffer used by the wireless network interface card
may overflow due to the large number of RREQs to be
sent.Similarly, genuine data packets may be dropped if
routing packets have priority over data packets.
C. Degrade the performance in RREQ packets :
Since RREQ packets are broadcast into the entire
network, the increased number of RREQ packets in the
network results in more MAC layer collisions and
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attack nodes, and 589 byte with four attack nodes. For
the packet size is 512 byte, it shows that all nodes in the
network can only receive a packet in one second.
Flooding nodes have exhausted the communication
bandwidth and node resource so that the valid
ommunication can not be kept any more. With the
increase of the number of attack nodes, the packet
average delay extends from 0.59 s to 9.6 s and then
remained at around 10 s. The average number of hops
decreases from 2.3 to 1.5 hops. It shows that most
packets which are more than two hops can not get to the
destination nodes because of the network congestion.

consequently, congestion in the network as well as
delays for the data packets. Higher level protocols like
TCP whichis sensitive to round trip times and
congestion in the network will be affected.
D. Degrade the performance in lifetime of Manet:
Since MANET nodes are likely to be power and
bandwidth constrained, RRFA can reduce the lifetime of
the network through useless RREQ transmissions as
well as additional overheads of authenticating a large
number of RREQs, if used.
a.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

C. Under different flooding Frequencies

To study the effect of flooding attack in mobile ad
hoc networks, The wireless networks simulation
software we use is NS2[13].

The packet loss rate starts from 3.5% under no
attack and increases to 16% under 20 packets/s flooding,
and 42% under 40 packets/s.

The following metrics is used to evaluate the
performance of flooding attack.
•

Packet loss rate:

The ratio of the number of packets dropped by the
nodes divided by the number of packets originated by
the application layer continuous bit rate (CBR) sources.
The packet loss ratio is important as it describes the loss
rate that can be seen by the transport protocols,which in
turn affects the maximum throughput that the network
can support. The metric characterizes both the
completeness and correctness of the routing protocol.
•

Average delay:

Average of delays incurred by all the packets
which are successfully transmitted.
•

Throughput:

Average number of packets per second× packet
size.
•

Average number of hops:

Total length of all routes divided by the total
number of routes. although behave legally, can not set
up paths to send data.
B. Under different number of attack nodes
There are 50 nodes, including 0–5 attack nodes. The
MAC bandwidth is set to 11 M. The frequency of
flooding attack is set to 100 packets/ s. During
simulation, the number of flooding nodes increases from
0 to 5.The packet loss rate starts from 3.5% under no
attack and increases to 54% with one attack node,
75%with two attack nodes, and more than 82 % with
three attack nodes. When the number of attack nodes is
greater than two, the network becomes considerably
congested. Throughput starts from 8 255 byte under no
attack and decreases to 2 324 byte with one attack node,
1 287 byte with two attack nodes, 1 287 byte with two
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E. Under different numbers of nodes
The packet loss rate increases from 42% to 70% as
the number of nodes increases from 25 to 100 under one
node’s attacking. Throughput is similar, whichdecreases from 3 665 byte to 743 byte as the number of
nodes increases from 25 to 100 under one node’s
attacking. With the increase of attack nodes, two above
parameters get closer and closer. Throughput nearly
drops to 0 under 5 nodes’ attacking. It shows that
flooding nodes have exhausted . the communication
bandwidth and node resources so that the valid
communication can not be kept.
When the flooding frequency is higher than 40
packets/s, the curve becomes flat.It shows that 40
packets/s is a turning point, and if the flooding
frequency is greater than 40, it would be difficult to
obtain apparent results. Similarly, throughput starts from
8 227 byte under no attack and decreases to 4 153 byte
under 20 packets/s flooding, 2 837 byte under 40
packets/s flooding, and 2 461 byte under 60 packets/s.
When the flooding frequency is greater than 40, the
throughput decline would be not obvious any more.
Average delay is similar to the above parameters, which
sharply increases from 0.19 s to 12 s when the flooding
frequency increases from 0 to 40 packets/s. The average
number of hops goes up to a peak 3.2 and then declines
to a stable value 2.5 in the end. This phenomenon can be
explained as, before the communication bandwidth and
node sources are exhausted, the average number of hops
increases in direct proportion to the increasing
frequency of flooding attacks due to more congestion.
However, when network resources have been exhausted,
with the increasing frequency of flooding attacks, nodes
begin to discard the congestion packets, especially those
which have a long route. It results in the loss of packets
with long routes and the remaining of packets with very
short routes.
D. Under different bandwidths
The packet loss rate is about 3% under no attack.
When the frequency of flooding attack is low (e.g., 20
packets/s), the packet loss rate decreases from 42 % to
16 % as network bandwidth increases from 1 M to
5.5M. However, when the flooding frequency goes
greater than 40 packets/s, the influence of bandwidth on
the network performance is not obvious. Throughput
and average delay are similar. This phenomenon can be
explained as the number of flooding packets is over
NIC’s network interface card’s (NIC’S) processing
power, and most of the packets in the queue are
discarded. Therefore, simply increasing the network
bandwidth can not improve network performance.
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checks the
t relationshipp and based on
o that it checkks for
the thresshold value iff it is less thann the thresholdd then
forward the packet ootherwise discaard the packeet and
blacklistt the neighbor node. The maiin problem witth this
method was it does nnot work well with higher node
mobilityy.
DSR
Thee Dynamic Souurce Routing (DSR)
(
protocool is a
on-demaand routing protocol.[2,9]. DSR prootocol
maintainns the route cacche to store thee route to the mobile
m
major
node it is
i aware. This protocol com
mposed of two m
phases : route disccovery and route
r
maintennance.
ver any node has the data to send, first it checks
c
Whenev
the routee cache for thee route to the destination
d
.if it has
the unexxpired route, then
t
it use it otherwise initiate a
route diiscovery process by broaddcasting the RREQ
R
packet which containns the sourcee address andd the
destinatiion address. W
Whenever any
y intermediate node
receives the RREQ, annd it does not have
h
the route to the
r
destinatiion it adds its own address in the route record
and forrward to its neighbor. RREP
R
is geneerated
wheneveer RREQ reeaches to deestination nodde or
intermeddiate node whiich has the rouute to destinatiion in
its routee cache. Routee maintenance mechanism iss used
to detectt whether the ppath to the desttination exist or
o not.
Route maintenance
m
uses the route error messagee and
acknowlledgement Rooute error meessage is iniitiated
wheneveer the destinatiion’s data link layer recognizze any
transmisssion error. DS
SR is suited foor small to meedium
sized neetworks as its packet overheead (not packett data
overheadd) can scale alll the way dow
wn to zero whhen all
nodes are relativelyy stationary. The packet data
overheadd will increasee significantlyy for networkss with
larger hop diameters as more routinng informationn will
need to be
b contained inn the packet heeaders.

y increases with
w
the increase of attack
Average delay
nodes, but it seems nothingg to do with thhe number off
nodes. Similarrly, the average number of hops
h
decreases
with the increaase of attack no
odes and it hass nothing to do
with the numbber of nodes.
V. PROPOS
SED APPROA
ACH
In [6], thee author propossed the distribuutive approach
to resist the flooding
f
attack
k. In this methhod they have
used the two
o threshold value; RATE
E_LIMIT and
BLACKLIST_
_LIMIT. If RR
REQ count off any node is
less then RAT
TE_LIMIT theen the requestt is processed
otherwise check
c
wheth
her it is less then
BLACKLIST_
_LIMIT, if yess then black lisst the node but
if the count is greater than RREQ_LIMIT
R
and less than
BLACKLIST_
_LIMIT then put
p the RREQ
Q in the delay
queue and prrocess after quueue time out occurs. This
method can Haandel the netw
work with high mobility.
m
In [7], thhe author analyyzed the floodding attack in
anonymous co
ommunication. They used the threshold
tuple which consist
c
of threee components:: transmission
threshold, blaccklist thresholdd and white listting threshold.
if any node generates RREQ
R
packett more than
t
thenn its neighborr discards the
transmission threshold
packet if it cro
osses the transm
mission threshold more than
blacklist thresh
hold then it blaack list the nod
de. But to deal
with accidentaal blacklisting
g they defined white listing
threshold. If any node perfforms good for
fo number off
intervals equaal to white listting threshold then it again
start treating as
a a normal nod
de.

In our
o work we have used thhe Dynamic Source
S
Routing (DSR) routinng protocol allong with the trust
estimatioon function. Because thhe communiccation
between
n the node inn the MANET depends onn the
cooperattion and the trust
t
level on its neighbors so to
calculatee the trust level
l
we hav
ve used the trust
estimatioon function in the Route discovery phase of
o the
basic DSR
D
routing protocol whichh will calculatte the
trust level of each neigghboring node. Various param
meters
which arre used for trusst estimation arre:

In [8], thee author used the extended DSR protocol
based on the trust functionn to mitigate the
t effects off
flooding attack. In this worrk, based on thhe trust value
i three categoories: Friends,
they categorizzed the nodes in
acquaintance and
a stranger. Stranger
S
are th
he non trusted
node, friends are the trustedd node and acq
quaintance has
the trust valuees more than stranger and lesss than friends.
Based on relaationship they defines the thhree threshold
value. If any node receivees the RREQ packets then

•

Totaal number of RREQ
R
packet sent
s by the neighbor
per unit time

•

totaal number of packet
p
successfully transmittted by
the neighbor

•

Rattio of number of packet receeived correctlyy from
the neighbor to thee total number of received paacket.
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In our scheme based on their relationship with the
neighboring node, we have categorized the node in three
categories that are given below.

•

A. STRANGER:

This table is referred every time when any node
receives the packets. Initially when node joins the
networks they are considered as a stranger. A node is
considered as a stranger if nodes have never sent or
receive message to or from the neighbor. A node is
considered as an acquaintance if its trust level is neither
very neither low nor too high means node receives some
packet through this neighbor. If node receives many
packets to or from any node successfully, then trust
level is very high the node is considered as a friend.
There is very high probability of attack from stranger
but very low probability from friend. Different threshold
values are defined for different types of neighbors to
become friend, Acquaintance and stranger. Tracq and
Trfri are the threshold values for the acquaintance and
the friend respectively. Along with this every node
maintains a local counter to count RREQ that is
compared with threshold value of neighbors. If RREQ
count is greater than Trfri then neighbor is considered as
a friend and if it is greater than Tracq and less than Trfri
then neighbor is acquaintance otherwise considered as a
stranger.

The strangers are the non trusted node means a
stranger node is a node with minimum trust level.
Initially when any node joins the network, then this trust
relationship with its all the neighbors are low or
negligible this that node is treated as stranger.
B. ACQUANTANCE:
These are the nodes which have the trust level
between the friends and stranger. Means a node is
acquaintance to its neighbor means it has received some
packets through that node.
C. FRIEND:
Friends are most trusted nodes or the nodes with
highest trust level can be treated as friends. Here the
higher trust level means neighbors had received or
transfer many packets successfully through this
particular node.
During the route discovery phase of the DSR
Routing protocol, the trust value is also computed for all
the neighbors of any node. The result of trust estimation
function is the relationship status of all of neighbors as
friend, acquaintance or stranger.

Second its relationship status with the neighbor
node that could be either friend, Acquaintance or
stranger.

To extend the method proposed in [5] for higher
node mobility, we added the concept of delay queue.
Consider the situation where the node mobility is very
higher so all most all the nodes relationship status can
be stranger or acquaintance because to become a friend
to its neighbor, node has to forward many packets
successfully to its neighbor. But because of the higher
mobility nodes changes its position frequently so
possibility of friend relationship is very low. As we
know that the threshold value of the stranger or
acquaintance is lower than the friends so if any node
sends many RREQ packets per unit time because of the
mobility this is considered as misbehavior because its
count exceeds threshold limits. Then according to
method proposed in [5], the neighbor node discards the
packets and declare the node as a intruder or malicious
node, which is not true. So to deal with such kind of
situations we have added the concept of delay queue
here.

Consider a MANET of figure 1 with seven
nodes.(n0 – n6) where node n1,n2,n3,n4,n5,n6 are the
neighbors node of node n0. Node n1 and n3 has a friend
relationship with n0, node n2 and n4 are stranger to n0
and n5 and n6 are acquaintance to node n0. These
relationships are shown in the friendship table 1.

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the influence of flooding attack on the
entire network performance is analyzed under the
circumstances of different parameters including the
number of attack nodes, flooding frequency, network
bandwidth, and the number of normal nodes. The future
work is that how the flooding attack is detected and
prevented using core node. The expected outcomes of
the implementation are Comparative of defenses

To detect the intrusion, in our scheme each node
stores a friendship table. Friendship table is used to store
the relationship status of any node with its neighbors.
The friendship table has two columns.
•

First the identifier or name of all of its neighboring
node
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available for attacks ,Metrics will be achieved through
the simulator, Simulated output of proposed method ,
Calculated metrics, Comparative with existing methods.
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